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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the denial of a petition for post conviction relief 
following an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
As explained by the district court's Memorandum of Decision on Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter Memorandum), in the original criminal 
case, Petitioner was charged with two counts of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with the Intent to Deliver. He was originally appointed the public 
defender; however, Petitioner then retained private counsel, Kevin Cassidy. The 
Information was amended to include the sentencing enhancement as a persistent 
violator. Later, Mr. Cassidy was permitted to withdraw as counsel of record and 
the public defender was reappointed as counsel for Petitioner. (R. p. 255-256.) 
The matter went to jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to 
the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver 
(Methamphetamine) and a verdict of not guilty as to the charge of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver (Cocaine). The jury also found 
the Petitioner to be a persistent violator. (R. p. 256.) 
Petitioner was sentenced to 10 years to life. He appealed, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed in a unpublished opinion. (R. p. 256.) 
The Memorandum then explained the post conviction procedure and 
claims: 
The petition for post-conviction relief was timely filed on January 
27, 2011, along with an affidavit in support of post-conviction relief. 
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On April 21, 2011, the petitioner filed his own supplemental affidavit 
and memorandum in support of post-conviction relief. The petitioner 
alleged that the prosecutor/court intimidated certain defense 
witnesses by advising them of their 5th Amendment Rights against 
self-incrimination and that his counsel were ineffective in (1) failing 
to file a motion to suppress; (2) failing to prepare for trial; (3) failing 
to interview witnesses; (4) failure to investigate; (5) failure to obtain 
the attendance of witnesses at trial; (6) that counsel withdrew and 
kept the fees paid; (7) that counsel waived petitioner's preliminary 
hearing; and (8) that the appellate counsel failed to raise certain 
issues on appeal. 
On May 17, 2011, the court entered its Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
the petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief as to certain claims 
asserted by the petitioner, leaving the claim that his attorney was 
ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress. 
On June 3, 2011, the petitioner, through his appointed counsel, 
filed a response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss together with an 
Affidavit of Timothy Jones. On June 15, 2011, this court issued an 
order partially dismissing the petitioner's claim for post-conviction 
relief. The sole remaining issue regards the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to file a motion to suppress 
evidence. 
Memorandum, p. 2-3. (R. p. 256-257.) 
An evidentiary hearing was held, after which the court took the matter 
under advisement. (R. p. 255.) 
The court denied relief in a written decision and entered an order of 




Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertions that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF FOLLOWING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, REJECTING 
PETITIONER'S ASSERTIONS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v. 
State, 132 Idaho 722,979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999): 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Follinus 
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil 
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief 
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post 
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be 
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v. 
State, 126 Idaho 24,28,878 P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. 
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal, 
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent 
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be 
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642, 
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal 
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id. 
Id. at p. 724-725. 
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B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Ruling 
In its Memorandum, the district court provided a long and comprehensive 
summary of the testimony from the evidentiary hearing. Thus, Appellant will 
simply provide that summary now and clarify and supplement as necessary 
further below. The court's summary is as follows: 
A. Timothy Jones 
Mr. Jones (Jones) was the landlord of the petitioner on the date of 
the underlying incident, October 3, 2007. In the evening of October 
3, 2007, the petitioner was at Jones' house picking up a door for 
the rental property, where petitioner resided at the time. Jones 
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testified that he and the petitioner were talking at his home in the 
evening when a police officer drove by the house very slowly, 
below the speed limit and the officer was "starring at us". Jones 
stated the speed limit was 35 m.p.h. and he estimated the police 
officer was driving at around 20 m.p.h. He thought that the officer's 
driving was odd. Shortly after, Jones testified that the petitioner left 
his residence, Jones watched the petitioner drive away and there 
were no vehicles behind McCall's car. Jones specifically stated that 
the petitioner put on his seatbelt and signaled before pulling away 
from the curb. Jones then went into his house, only to leave very 
shortly thereafter to go to the store. Jones could see several police 
officers down the road and saw that the petitioner had been 
stopped 1.5 blocks from Jones' house. Jones did not stop, but 
drove by the police and petitioner on his way to the store. Jones 
testified that the petitioner was stopped past Mr. Patterson's house. 
Jones also described the location of Mr. Patterson's house being in 
the 500 block, as well as its surroundings, to point out that his 
house and Mr. Patterson's house could not be confused with each 
other. Jones also testified that he did not believe he was biased in 
this matter. He stated that everyone must obey the law, including 
the police. 
On cross-examination, Jones said that his house is on the south 
side of the road. He said that Mr. Patterson's house is six houses 
down from his, on the next block. Jones said he was in his house 
for a short period before he left for the store. Jones said that when 
he left for the store he could not see the police or petitioner from 
inside his house or the porch. Jones also said that he could not 
recall exactly where the police stop occurred. Jones testified that he 
did not know if the petitioner had stopped anywhere else before 
being pulled over by the police. Jones also testified that he has 
ADHD and did not record the incidents on the day they occurred. 
Jones was also not contacted by any of the petitioner's attorneys 
until the summer of 2011. 
This court inquired as to when Jones spoke to the petitioner about 
the stop. Jones said he talked to petitioner when he was released 
on bail, but the petitioner never said that his attorney would be in 
contact with Jones. 
B. Michael McCall 
The petitioner, McCall, also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He 
testified that at around 8 p.m. he was at Jones' house to pay rent 
and pick up a door. McCall testified that he and Jones loaded the 
door into McCall's truck and then talked. McCall then left Jones' 
house and was pulled over by a restaurant. McCall said he did not 
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make any other stops before he was pulled over. McCall said the 
officer told him he failed to signal, but McCall denied that. McCall 
then stated the officer asked for his license, insurance and 
registration. He had several vehicles, so he handed the officer 
multiple insurance cards. He also testified that he is hard of 
hearing. 
McCall testified that there were other police officers present at the 
scene and that the officer with the drug dog arrived within 20 
seconds of the stop. A "drug dog" was walked around his vehicle 
three times. McCall said the officer gave the dog a signal and it 
jumped on the truck trying to attack him. McCall believes the dog 
was on a leash. McCall said the officers told him the dog had 
"indicated" on his vehicle. McCall told them they did not have 
permission to search his vehicle. The officers searched his pockets. 
The officers showed him a bag and McCall told them he had never 
seen it before. He was then arrested. McCall is not sure if he was 
ever read his Miranda rights. McCall was appointed a public 
defender but then hired Kevin Cassidy (Cassidy) privately. McCall 
testified that he told Cassidy to file a motion to suppress. Cassidy 
withdrew and McCall was again represented by the public 
defender. McCall also testified that he was never issued a traffic 
ticket. 
On cross-examination, McCall testified that the officer told him why 
he had been stopped. There was no lapse in time before the drug 
dog arrived. The dog was there while the initial officer went through 
McCall's registration. McCall testified that the dog was trying to bite 
him and was attacking, not alerting. McCall testified that he had 
never heard the audio tapes from the stop. McCall said he told his 
public defender that his rights had been violated and told his private 
counsel to file a motion to suppress. Cassidy did tell McCall that the 
police did not have to issue a traffic ticket, but did not explain why. 
Additionally, on redirect McCall testified that he had a list of 
witnesses, but Cassidy did not speak to them. McCall stated he 
kept lists of things related to the trial and he had filing a motion to 
suppress on these lists. 
C. Preston Stephenson 
Officer Stephenson on October 3, 2007 was a patrol officer for the 
Twin Falls Police Department. Officer Stephenson (Stephenson) is 
the officer that stopped McCall. He was traveling westbound on 2nd 
Avenue East. He observed the petitioner pull away from the curb in 
the 500 Block of 2nd Ave East without the use of his turn signal. He 
stopped McCall on the 400 block for a traffic violation. Stephenson 
testified that McCall behaved nervously, which made him nervous. 
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Stephenson then called for another unit. McCall was stopped on 2nd 
Avenue, a one way street. Stephenson was not involved in the 
canine search. He did not observe the dog become aggressive 
towards McCall. Stephenson said that McCall gave him around 20 
insurance cards to sort through. He asked McCall to sit on the curb. 
Stephenson never issued McCall a ticket because it was in his 
discretion and he was too busy. 
On cross-examination, Stephenson said that at the time of the stop 
he was on his way back to the police station. He had no recollection 
of where he was coming from, but stated he had not circled the 
block prior to the stop. Stephenson had listened to the audio tape. 
He testified that the canine used at this stop was a passive 
indicator, meaning she sits when she has found an odor. 
Stephenson did not know that McCall was hard of hearing until they 
arrived at the police station. Stephenson said that while he had 
dealt with other hearing impaired individuals, he did not know if 
McCall's nervous behavior was consistent with other hearing 
impaired persons. 
D. Ryan Howe 
Officer Howe (Howe) is a canine handler. Cinder is the name of his 
canine. She trained with another handler prior to him. Cinder is a 
passive indicator and is certified to detect heroin, cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and marijuana. While false positives can occur 
with drug dogs, Cinder has never failed a certification. Certification 
lasts 15 months, but there is ongoing training. Howe testified that 
Cinder is very docile. When she indicates her tail also wags and her 
ears perk up. Howe testified that he did take Cinder around the 
vehicle and that, on one attempt, Stephenson was standing next to 
the vehicle's door. Howe was concerned about a "blocking effect," 
so he started the search again. Howe testified that Cinder made no 
aggressive moves toward McCall. Howe did not recall if Cinder was 
on or off leash for the search. Howe said Cinder had two final 
indicators and, at that time, McCall was removed from the vehicle. 
Howe then searched the vehicle and found what appeared to be 
drugs. Those items were turned over to Stephenson. 
On cross-examination, Howe stated he keeps a log of each canine 
search. Howe did not know how frequently a canine alerts to the 
odor of drugs when drugs are not present. Howe listened to the 
audio tape of the stop and said no other dogs were present at the 
scene, any barking is likely that of Cinder. 
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E. Kevin Cassidy 
Cassidy represented McCall after McCall was initially represented 
by the public defender. Cassidy said he did talk with McCall about 
the traffic stop, but he said McCall never mentioned any witnesses. 
Cassidy said he sent the discovery to McCall, but he does not recall 
going over the discovery with McCall. Cassidy also said he 
discussed a motion to suppress with McCall, but stated McCall 
never asked him to file one. Cassidy testified that you rarely ever 
see a traffic ticket issued for the underlying traffic violation. Cassidy 
recalls talking to McCall about McCall's rights being violated. 
Cassidy did not recall if they talked about the canine search being 
in evidence. If a motion to suppress has been filed, pulling away 
from the street curb and the canine search would have been the 
central issues. Cassidy did not think a motion to suppress would be 
viable and he communicated this to McCall. 
On cross-examination, Cassidy testified that he did not remember if 
he listened to the audio tapes of the stop. He is not sure if he 
contacted any potential witnesses, but he recalls talking about at 
least one, though he does not recall talking about the landlord, 
Jones. Cassidy did review the file on this case prior to the 
evidentiary hearing and believes he talked to one witness. Cassidy 
did not pass the file on to the public defender after he withdrew, 
because it was not requested. Cassidy does not recall if McCall 
was read his Miranda rights, but he also does not recall McCall 
making any suppressible statements. Cassidy does not recall 
McCall making any admissions. 
F. Robin Weeks 
Robin Weeks (Weeks) was the public defender originally assigned 
to represent McCall. She represented him until the first preliminary 
hearing. She talked with McCall about the traffic stop and has notes 
in the file. She did not see any suppressible issues after reviewing 
the file thoroughly. Cassidy then took over. When she received the 
case back from Cassidy the case was well passed the deadlines to 
file a motion to suppress. Weeks testified that Jones was discussed 
with McCall by someone else in her office, because there are notes 
in the file regarding this issue. She also believes she would have 
talked with McCall about this, though she does not have notes in 
the file to reflect that conversation. Weeks testified that she still 
thought there were no suppressible issues, because even if the 
police officer was mistaken, he could still stop McCall. Weeks also 
discussed the canine search with McCall and believed there were 
no suppressible issues. 
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On cross-examination, Weeks testified that she advised McCall to 
waive his preliminary hearing. She said a preliminary hearing can 
be a place to "flush out" potential suppression issues, but she does 
not feel they are to be used to "fish" for issues. She again stated 
she saw no suppression issues. Weeks spoke to witnesses and 
reviewed the audio tapes of the stop. Weeks does not recall 
speaking to the landlord, Jones. When Weeks received the case 
back from Cassidy, she said the focus was on knowledge and how 
the drugs got into the car. This court asked her when the notes 
regarding the landlord were made. Weeks said they are not dated, 
but she believes them to be from early on in the case, either before 
Cassidy took over or immediately after. 
Memorandum, p. 4-10. (R. p. 258-264.) 
The court then analyzed whether Petitioner's counsel was ineffective for 
failing to bring a motion to suppress. The court started with determining whether 
counsel was deficient, and after reciting the standards, explained as follows: 
. . . The petitioner argues that his counsel should have filed a 
motion to suppress on the basis that he did not commit the traffic 
infraction testified to by officer Stephenson and that the drug dog's 
alert on his vehicle was not reliable. 
I.C. § 49-808 requires a driver to signal when moving right or left or 
leaving a parked position. "fAJ traffic stop will not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the officer reasonably suspects a violation of traffic 
laws even if later investigation dispels the suspicion." State v. 
Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673, 675-76 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Therefore, even if the officer was mistaken, his belief that McCall 
violated a traffic law provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. 
Additionally, "[t]he drug dog alert on the outside of the vehicle 
provided probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle." State 
v. Anderson, No. 36406, 2011 WL 1744274, at * 5 (Ct.App. April 
28, 2011). The admission of testimony of a drug dog's positive 
indication for the presence of drugs is dependent upon a 
foundational showing of the dogs "training and reliability". State v. 
Braend/e, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634, 636 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The testimony of officer Howe established the training and reliability 
of his dog Cinder and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
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The petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in that 
counsel should have filed a motion to suppress on the basis that 
the petitioner did not commit the traffic violation that was the basis 
of the stop. Not only has the petitioner not provided any evidence 
that a motion to suppress would have been granted, he has also 
not presented any evidence that there were any suppressible 
issues. The crux of the petitioner's argument is that when he pulled 
away from the residence of Mr. Jones in the 600 block that he 
used his turn signal and Mr. Jones also testified that the petitioner 
used his turn signal. After the petitioner left Mr. Jones did not 
observe petitioner further since he returned to his home. Mr. Jones 
does not know if the petitioner made any other stops. The petitioner 
testified that he made no other stops, however, the petitioner 
testified in his affidavit that at the time of the traffic stop he was 
pulling away from the curb in the 500 block which is consistent with 
what officer Stephenson observed. (In the petitioner's affidavit of 
January 25, 2011 he admits that "on October 3, 2007 I was 
pulling away from the curb in the 500 Block of Second Avenue 
East"). Officer Stephenson testified consistently with his trial 
testimony. At trial the officer testified that he was on patrol at about 
8:30 p.m. when he observed the petitioner and he testified as 
follows: 
Q. And did you notice anything out of the ordinary at 
around 8:30 that night? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. And what was that? 
A. I was travelling westbound on Second Avenue East in 
approximately the 600 block when I observed a 
vehicle pull away from the curb in the 500 block of 
Second Avenue. When pulling away from the curb, 
the vehicle failed to signal so I initiated a traffic stop 
on the vehicle. 
Q. Was there anything else ordinary or unordinary about 
the vehicle? 
A. There was nothing unordinary about the vehicle. The 
location where it pulled away from was a location that 
I've received information from our narcotics detectives 
that was involved in the possible sale of 
methamphetamine and other narcotics and was later 
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found a meth lab was being produced out of that 
facility. 
(Tr. pg. 72, L.25 to pg. 73, L.17) 
Timothy Jones testified that there was a house in the 500 block that 
was found to be a meth lab consistent with the testimony of officer 
Stephenson. 
The fact that the petitioner did not receive a traffic citation does not 
support the argument that there was no basis for the traffic stop. 
Mr. Cassidy testified that he did investigate and consider the 
viability of a suppression motion and he determined that such a 
motion would not be viable, especially since there was no evidence 
that the traffic stop was unduly delayed by reason of the drug dog. 
Since the petitioner has the burden in this proceeding to show that 
the motion to suppress would have been granted it is therefore his 
burden to show that the drug dog and its handler were not properly 
trained or reliable. The defendant has not proved the drug dog was 
either untrained or unreliable. After the evidentiary hearing, this 
court must determine that McCall's allegations are just that, 
conclusory allegations. This court has been provided with no 
evidence that the officers perjured themselves, nor that trial 
counsel, by a preponderance of the evidence, did not meet the 
objective standards of competence. As this court has been 
provided with no evidence of any suppressible issues, it cannot find 
that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress, 
which may very well have been frivolous. 
Memorandum, p. 14-16 (bold emphasis in the original, underlined emphasis 
added). (R. p. 268-270.) 
The court then went on to analyze whether Petition was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficiency. 
Even if this court did find trial counsel deficient, which it does not, 
McCall would have to show that this deficiency prejudiced him. He 
would have to show how the result of the proceedings would have 
been different, absent the deficiency. Further, as to the element of 
prejudice that the defendant must show, it must be "actual and 
definite, not speculative." [internal citations omitted] 
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McCall has not shown that but for trial counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. He has not shown that a motion to suppress would have 
been granted. McCall has said he told his attorneys his rights were 
violated and told this court he would not have taken his petition this 
far had he not sincerely felt this way. 
Unfortunately, McCall has not demonstrated which, if any, rights 
were violated. Testimony was provided that Officer Stephenson 
believed McCall violated a traffic law, thus providing reasonable 
suspicion for the stop. Testimony by Officer Howe disclosed that his 
drug dog indicated on McCall's vehicle providing probable cause for 
the search, which resulted in controlled substances being found. 
The testimony further provided that both Ms. Weeks and Mr. 
Cassidy reviewed the file for suppressible issues and discussed the 
motion to suppress with McCall, yet, neither counsel believed there 
to be any suppressible issues. With the evidence provided thus far, 
this court would have to agree. No evidence has been provided that 
the officers or attorneys have testified falsely or that the drug dog 
was unreliable. As McCall cannot show that the motion to suppress 
would likely have been granted, he has not shown prejudice. 
McCall has not met either, let alone both, elements of the Strickland 
test. 
Memorandum, p. 17 (emphasis added). (R. p. 271.) 
D. The Court Erred in Denying Post Conviction Relief 
Petitioner asserts that the district court erred in denying post conviction 
relief for two main reasons. First, it was mistaken about the law, and second, it 
was mistaken about the evidence. The mistake of law will be discussed first. 
To begin with, there were actually two potential suppression issues before 
the court, first, the reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and second, the dog 
sniff and resulting search. Appellant here challenges only the grounds for the 
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initial traffic stop.1 
Obviously, the crux of the issue should be whether or not Mr. McCall used 
his turn signal. If he did not then the traffic stop was valid, if he did then there 
was in fact no reasonable suspicion that a crime was, had been, or was going to 
be committed. As the court explained, Mr. McCall testified he did use his signal, 
as did Mr. Jones. On the other hand, Office Stephenson testified that Mr. McCall 
failed to use his signal. 
The court in its Memorandum avoids the issue of what actually happened 
by ruling that it does not matter what happened: 
I.C. § 49-808 requires a driver to signal when moving right or left or 
leaving a parked position. "[A] traffic stop will not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the officer reasonably suspects a violation of traffic 
laws even if later investigation dispels the suspicion." State v. 
Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673, 675-76 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Therefore, even if the officer was mistaken, his belief that McCall 
violated a traffic law provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. 
Memorandum, p. 14. (R. p. 268.) 
Appellant asserts that the district court has plucked a line out of State v. 
Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010), and used it out of context 
while ignoring the rest of what that case said. The full passage from Horton 
stated was as follows: 
In Fourth Amendment applications, the reasonableness of police 
conduct is judged against an objective standard. State v. Weaver, 
127 Idaho 288, 291, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (1995). We examine 
1 While Appellant also asserts the court erred when it summarily dismissed the 
claims that Mr. McCall had received ineffective assistance of counsel for failure 
to investigate and failure to interview witnesses concerning the motion to 
suppress the traffic stop, these errors collapse into the merits of the issue 
regarding whether counsel should have brought a motion to suppress and so the 
propriety of their summary dismissal will not be separately addressed. 
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whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure . . . [would] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). See also 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S. Ct. 2793,111 L. Ed. 
2d 148 (1990). This standard allows room for some mistakes on the 
part of police officers, so long as the mistakes are those of 
reasonable persons. [internal citations omitted] 
"[I]n order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they 
always be reasonable." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185. Subjective 
good faith on the part of the officer is not enough. As the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, "If subjective good faith 
alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The mistake must be one that would be 
made by a reasonable person acting on the facts known to the 
officer. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 401, 958 
P.2d at 27. In sum, a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth 
Amendment if the officer reasonably suspects a violation of traffic 
laws even if later investigation dispels the suspicion. 
Id., p. 302-303. 
In our case, the court found merely that the police officer believed that Mr. 
McCall failed to use his turn signal. But as explained above, the subjective good 
faith of a police officer is not enough. Either the traffic infraction had to have in 
fact occurred, or the police officer's mistaken belief that it had occurred had to 
have been objectively reasonable. 
But in our case, the court does not find whether the turn signal was used 
or not, or if it was not, whether the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable. 
Again, it merely found that the police officer believed that Mr. McCall failed to use 
his signal. 
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Since the court did not determine whether or not the officer's belief was 
reasonable, our case is like State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 111 P .3d 625 
(Ct.App. 2005). There, an officer stopped a car because it failed to dim its bright 
headlights, but both the driver and passenger testified that they were in fact on 
low beam. The magistrate suppressed the evidence finding that the headlights 
had been on low beam and holding there could accordingly be no violation or the 
statute (or reasonable suspicion). The Court of Appeals held that an improperly 
adjusted low beam could still violate the statue, and what's more, that the police 
officer could mistakenly, but reasonably and lawfully stop a vehicle that was in 
compliance and cited to the same passages as did Horton, supra. 
The Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
In the present case, the magistrate found that Kimball's headlights 
were on low beam, a finding to which we defer because it is 
supported by testimony given at the suppression hearing. But the 
magistrate did not continue to the next necessary determinations--
whether the deputy nevertheless actually believed that Kimball was 
driving with his headlights on high beam in violation of the law and, 
if so, whether that belief was objectively reasonable. The first of 
these questions involves, in part, credibility determinations, and 
therefore must be made in the first instance by the trial court ..... 
Kimball, p. 493. 
The Court of Appeals went on to explain that remand was necessary 
because while the magistrate clearly found the police officer was wrong about 
the headlights being on high beam, he did not address whether the officer was 
credible in that belief or whether his mistake was reasonable. 
Kimball argues that the magistrate's statement in its written order 
regarding Deputy Smyth's "subjective, unsubstantiated and 
mistaken belief' that the headlights were on high beam constitutes 
a factual finding that Smyth's testimony about his observation of 
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Kimball's lights was not credible. We do not agree. The magistrate 
clearly found that Deputy Smyth was wrong about the headlights 
being on high beam, but the magistrate did not address whether the 
deputy was credible in asserting his belief that the headlights were 
on high beam or, if so, whether the deputy's mistake was 
reasonable. Nowhere in the record did either party point out, nor did 
the magistrate court expressly recognize, that the court must 
decide whether Deputy Smyth's mistake was that of a reasonable 
person in the circumstances. The magistrate's finding that Kimball's 
lights were on low beam necessarily encompasses a finding that 
the testimony of Kimball and his passenger on that issue was 
credible. It does not, however, inherently constitute a finding that 
Deputy Smyth's testimony that Kimball's lights appeared "extremely 
bright, distracting and at his eye level" so that he believed that 
Kimball's lights were on high beam, was not credible. This Court will 
not surmise that the magistrate intended an "inherent" finding on an 
issue that was not directly addressed. Therefore, remand is 
necessary for a finding by the magistrate as to whether Deputy 
Smyth, though mistaken, reasonably suspected that Kimball was 
driving with his headlights on high beam. If the magistrate finds 
that Deputy Smyth made an honest and reasonable mistake, the 
stop was lawful and suppression must be denied. If the magistrate 
finds that the officer did not entertain an honest belief that the 
lights were on high beam, or that any such belief was 
unreasonable, suppression is required. 
Id., p. 493. 
Our case goes farther still, because the court did not even find that the 
turn signal was used or not used. While it recognized the conflicting testimony, it 
avoided the question because it misunderstood the law and apparently believed 
all that was required was the police officer's belief. "Testimony was provided 
that Officer Stephenson believed McCall violated a traffic law, thus providing 
reasonable suspicion for the stop." Memorandum, p. 17. (R. p. 271.) 
But as in Kimball, the court never determined whether the officer's belief 
that Mr. McCall did not use his turn signal was reasonable. For example, the 
officer merely testified that he did not observe a signal, he never testified that he 
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was in a position to see one used. His testimony was that he was traveling in one 
block and Mr. McCall was in the next block, so there was a distance issue. Nor 
was a clear line of sight ever established, or that the officer was paying attention 
to Mr. McCall's vehicle at the relevant time. 
This is important, because the officer testified merely that he observed the 
vehicle pulling out from the curb and it did not signal when pulling away from the 
curb. But this does not describe a signaling violation. The statute only requires 
signaling before turning from a parked position, not while turning from a parked 
position. So if Mr. McCall properly signaled while stationary, then ceased 
signaling as he pulled out, the officer's belief he had violated the law would have 
been mistaken, as well as unreasonable, since it did not account for what the law 
actually requires. 
It also cannot be inferred that the court implicitly held that Mr. McCall 
failed to use his signal from the outcome of the case. Just like in Kimball, while 
our court held that there was no evidence that the officer perjured himself (more 
on this below), this is not the same as the court actually finding that the officer 
was right. As explained above, the officer could have been sincerely but 
unreasonably mistaken in his belief and thus suppression would have been 
required. 
Further, the court appears by its citation to mistakenly rely on the principle 
that a stop can be upheld even when the reasonable suspicion is dispelled. 
The perfect example of that sort of case is State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1996), where a police officer stopped a car for not having license plates 
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and then when approaching it, saw with a flashlight a valid temporary registration 
sticker in the window but nevertheless still contacted the driver and determined 
he was intoxicated. Even though the reason for the stop dissipated, since it had 
been based on a reasonable mistake, the evidence of intoxication was 
admissible. 
Appellant asserts that the same is not true where the alleged infraction 
is the failure to use a turn signal. This is a black or white sort of offense, the 
signal was used or wasn't. It is also a strict liability offense and so functioning 
equipment or intent does not need to be determined, and no subsequent 
investigation would help determine whether the turn signal was used or not. 
Certainly in this case the officer did not reconsider his belief after Mr. McCall 
explained to him that he did use his signal. So again, our case does not present 
a scenario where later investigation can prove the officer wrong but the stop was 
nevertheless reasonable. 
To summarize, the court made a mistake of law when it failed to determine 
whether or not there was valid reasonable suspicion for the stop. The court 
failed to determined if the infraction in fact occurred, and if it did not, whether the 
officer's mistake was objectively reasonable. Nor can the court's potential 
findings be inferred from its rulings since it was laboring under an 
misunderstanding as to the law. In short, this matter must be remanded so that 
the court can determine, with reference to the correct law, whether the stop was 
valid. Since there are obviously factual questions which need to be addressed 
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but were unaddressed due to the misunderstanding of what the law required, 
Appellant asserts that a new evidentiary hearing should be held. 
The second error of the court is that it repeatedly stated in its 
Memorandum that Mr. McCall provided no evidence that there were suppressible 
issues or that the police officer testified falsely or perjured himself. This is not 
correct, Mr. McCall did provide evidence, which was his testimony and that of 
Tim Jones, as well as the dispatch log. Both Mr. McCall and Mr. Jones testified 
that Mr. McCall used his turn signal, which is evidence that there was a 
suppressible issue. Further, as explained above, the officer's contrary testimony 
does not actually establish a traffic violation. 
In short, regardless of how the court weighs the Petitioner's evidence, it 
must acknowledge and consider it, rather than simply disregarding it and then 
claiming he didn't produce any evidence. 
The same is true as to Mr. McCall's varying statements about whether he 
was ever stopped in the 500 block of 2nd Avenue. In this original pro se affidavit 
in support of his pro se petition he says that he was pulling away from the 500 
block. (R. p. 10.) In a later filed memorandum in support, he specifically explains 
that he was never stopped in the 500 block of 2nd Ave., but was parked in the 600 
block and at his landlord's located at 636. (R. p. 82.) In another affidavit in 
support he again states he was at 632 and pulled away from the 600 block and 
never stopped in the 500 block. (R. p. 130.) In his testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing Mr. McCall states he was at his landlord's house (at 632) and after he 
pulled away from it he never stopped anywhere else. (Tr. 9/12/2011, p. 26-27.) 
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So in the four times that Mr. McCall explained where he was, he says in 
three of those that he was never stopped in the 500 block, and two of those were 
under oath. During his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the discrepancy was 
never pointed out and he was never asked to explain by counsel, or by the court, 
which itself questioned at least two other witnesses. 
But yet, in the Memorandum decision, the court latches onto Mr. McCall's 
aberrant statement that he was pulling away from the 500 block in the first 
affidavit and considered it to be his admission that he had done this and that it 
confirmed the officer's testimony. While the court can of course weigh the 
various statements how it sees fit, it cannot just ignore the three other statements 
without acknowledging them or the fact that Mr. McCall was never asked whether 
he could reconcile them. 
Further, the court (wrongly) disregards the testimony of Tim Jones, 
presumably because he testified he went back into the house and so did not 
watch Mr. McCall continuously from his departure from where he was parked 
immediately in front of Mr. Jones' house, to when he was stopped by police. But 
the court ignores that Mr. Jones did specifically testify that before going back in 
his house, Mr. McCall had already driven past the house in the next block from 
which the police officer claimed he had pulled away. (Tr. 9/12/2011, p. 10.) In 
other words, the court was wrong in apparently deciding that Mr. Jones' 
testimony did not support Petitioner because he did not know whether Mr. McCall 
had stopped again and then did not use his signal. Instead, Mr. Jones provided 
direct support that Mr. McCall was not stopped where the police officer claimed. 
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Additionally, contrary to the court's decision, there is objective evidence 
that the police officer perjured himself which does not rely on anything that Mr. 
McCall said. As the court explained in its summary, Office Stephenson testified 
that Mr. McCall was nervous and that made him nervous and so he called for 
another officer. Officer Stephenson did testify that while exiting his vehicle, he 
observed Mr. McCall continuously looking into his rear view mirror trying to locate 
him and noticed his hands were on the steering wheel and he was very nervous 
and trembling which made the officer nervous and so shortly after stopping him 
he asked for another unit to come and help him for safety reasons. (Tr. 
9/12/2011, p. 47.) While no doubt the call for assistance did happen relatively 
quickly, everything that the officer described obviously did not happen in 20 
seconds, which is when the dispatch log shows the second officer became 
involved. (R. p. 30.) Rather, the dispatch log supports Mr. McCall's testimony 
that there was no time lapse before the other officer and the drug dog arrived. 
(Tr. 9/12/2011, p. 38.) 
Finally, while the court does not weigh the credibility of the witnesses and 
instead just disregards Mr. McCall's evidence, it is not incredible evidence either. 
Mr. Jones was simply Mr. McCall's landlord, and he was a former National Guard 
member and current United States Forest Service employee with no apparent 
reason to lie for Mr. McCall. (Tr. 9/12/2011, p. 11, 23.) As to whether he was 
using a turn signal or not, Mr. McCall and Mr. Jones had reason to be paying 
attention, the police had just driven by and were staring at them so it makes 
perfect sense that Mr. McCall would be scrupulously obeying the law and Mr. 
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Jones would notice and remember what would under other circumstances be 
unremarkable actions. 
On the other hand, the police officer, who testified he couldn't remember 
where he was coming from but did not circle the block, supposedly saw Mr. 
McCall fail to signal when pulling out from the curb into the street in the block 
ahead. 
So to summarize the second error of the court, the court failed to consider 
Petitioner's evidence, and instead ruled that he had provided none. Petitioner did 
provide evidence of a suppressible issue and of the officer's perjury via testimony 
and the dispatch log. However, the court made no credibility decisions because it 
simply ignored the evidence. Thus, the dismissal must also be reversed for this 
reason and the case remanded for the district court to make proper findings 
regarding the evidence, which would best be done after a new evidentiary 
hearing where the factual questions can be resolved including the question of Mr. 
McCall's' actual location. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post conviction relief be 
reversed and this matter remanded for a further evidentiary 
alternative, for additional findings by the district court. 
C; 1-
DATED this ~ day of February, 2012. 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiS~ day of February, 2012, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by the method as 
indicated below: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY A TIORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 1083720-0010 
24 
